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Government spending shocks are frequently identiﬁed in quarterly time-series data by
ruling out a contemporaneous response of government spending to other macroeconomic
aggregates. We provide evidence that this assumption may not be too restrictive for U.S.
annual time-series data.
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1 Introduction
Vector autoregressions (VAR) are by now frequently employed to study the ﬁscal transmission
mechanism. In order to identify government spending shocks, a number of authors assume that
there is no contemporaneous response of government spending to macroeconomic aggregates,
i.e. that government spending is predetermined.1 This requires that government spending does
i) neither respond automatically to the economy, ii) nor that it is adjusted in a discretionary
manner within the period. The ﬁrst requirement is likely to be satisﬁed if government spending
does not include transfers, but only government consumption and investment (a commonly
used deﬁnition of government spending). Whether the second requirement is satisﬁed depends
on the extent of decision lags in the policy process and thus on the data frequency.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and several subsequent studies impose the identiﬁcation as-
sumption on quarterly time-series data for the U.S., thereby ruling out a discretionary policy
response to the state of the economy within the quarter. However, as non-interpolated ﬁs-
cal data are often not available for other countries at quarterly frequency, several authors
impose the identiﬁcation assumption at an annual frequency (see Beetsma, Giuliodori and
Klaassen 2006, Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaasen 2008, Benetrix and Lane 2009). Judged a
priori, the identiﬁcation assumption is more compelling when imposed at quarterly frequency.
∗We thank Helmuth Lütkepohl for helpful discussions. The usual disclaimer applies. Please address corre-
spondence to bborn@uni-bonn.de or gernot.mueller@uni-bonn.de
1This approach goes back to Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Alternative identiﬁcation schemes are based on
military events or sign restrictions, see, e.g. Ramey (2008) and Mountford and Uhlig (forthcoming).While there is only one budget legislated before the beginning of the ﬁscal year, supplements
throughout the year are always a possibility (see Perotti 2005).
However, as ﬁscal data are available at quarterly frequency for the U.S., it is possible to actually
test the assumption that U.S. government spending is predetermined within the year. In this
paper, we suggest and perform such tests. We spell out and impose restrictions on a quarterly
VAR model implied by the assumption that annual government spending is predetermined.
We ﬁnd that these restrictions are not rejected by the data. Also, the identiﬁed shocks and the
resulting impulse response functions are very similar to those obtained from an unrestricted
model.2 Finally, we compare impulse responses and shocks obtained from the quarterly model
with those from the annual model and ﬁnd a high degree of conformity.
2 A structural VAR model
In this section, we devise a simple test of the assumption that annual government spending
is predetermined. We proceed in three steps. First, we specify a data generating process
operating at quarterly frequency where government spending is predetermined. Second, we
aggregate the quarterly model and, third, we spell out restrictions on the quarterly model
under which annual government spending is predetermined.
2.1 Data generating process




 ′, where gt denotes government
spending and xt denotes a n × 1 vector of additional variables. The data are sampled at
quarterly frequency through the structural VAR(4) model:







 ′ is a vector of mutually uncorrelated structural shocks.
We assume that government spending is predetermined, i.e. that the non-ﬁscal entries of
the ﬁrst row of A(0) are zero. Further assuming that A(0) is lower triangular allows recur-
sive estimation of model (1) by OLS without loss of generality, as long as the interest is in
identifying government spending shocks and no structural interpretation is given to εx
t (see
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 1999). For future reference, it is convenient to partition

































, i = 1...4, (2)
where Q is a lower-triangular matrix with 1’s on its main diagonal.
2In a similar experiment, Beetsma et al. (2006) consider German data and transform estimates from a
quarterly model into the corresponding coeﬃcients of an annual model. They ﬁnd evidence supporting the
assumption that annual government spending is predetermined.
22.2 Aggregation
We are now interested in how data generated by the process (1) aggregates into data sampled
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It is convenient to reshuﬄe the variables in ητ. Let
  ητ =
 






and use a ‘tilde’ to denote the appropriately reshuﬄed counterparts of the matrices B(i),i =
0,1, and the shock vector uτ. One may then write (3) as follows:
  B(0)  ητ =   B(1)  ητ−1 +   uτ. (4)
Aggregating a quarterly time series into an annual time series, denoted by an ‘a’-superscript,






















Here, ι is a row vector of ones and K an appropriately deﬁned matrix. Applying F to the
reduced form system of (4) gives
ya
τ = FC   B(1)  ητ−1 + FC  uτ, (5)
where C−1 =   B(0).
2.3 When is annual spending predetermined?
Relationship (5) maps quarterly data into annual observations. We spell out suﬃcient condi-
tions on the underlying quarterly model such that annual government spending is predeter-
mined, i.e. we require that the linear mapping FC in (5) excludes non-ﬁscal innovations to
have an impact on ga
t . We can then state the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Annual government spending is predetermined with respect to xa
t if the fol-













gx, i = 1,2,3, is deﬁned in (2).
3Proof. See appendix A.
These restrictions only concern the ﬁrst equation of our quarterly model (1), allowing us to




gx = 0 (7)
in the single OLS regression











, i = 1,...,4.





r is the residual variance of regression (8) when the restrictions are imposed, σ2
u is
the residual variance of the unrestricted regression, and T is the number of observations. For
the likelihood ratio statistic, we assume joint normality of the disturbances. As an alternative
approach, which is robust to variations in the underlying distribution, we consider the Wald
statistic. Let β =
 
β1 β2 β3 β4
 ′ and   β its corresponding sample estimator. The null
hypothesis that a subvector β0 of β is equal to zero can then be tested by the Wald statistic
W =   β′
0V −1
0   β0 (10)
where V0 denotes the submatrix of the estimated covariance matrix V corresponding to   β0.
Both the likelihood ratio and the Wald statistic have a limiting χ2(j)-distribution where j is
the number of zero restrictions imposed on β.
3 Evidence from U.S. time-series data
In this section, we proceed in three steps. First, we brieﬂy discuss our data and empirical
speciﬁcation. Second, we use quarterly data to test whether annual government spending is
predetermined. Third, we compare results obtained on the basis of annual and quarterly data.
3.1 Data and speciﬁcation
In the following, we estimate a VAR model on U.S. time-series data covering the period
1954–2007. We use quarterly data to estimate equation (1), where the model also contains
a constant and a linear time trend. In the baseline case, the vector of endogenous variables
contains government spending, GDP, and private consumption.3 Given the limited number
of annual observations, this parsimonious speciﬁcation allows a comparison with the results
obtained from a VAR model estimated on annual data for the same sample period. To explore
the robustness of our results, we also consider a 7-variable VAR model for quarterly data,
augmenting the baseline VAR with net tax revenues, private investment, inﬂation, and the
3-month T-bill rate, thereby following Perotti’s (2007) speciﬁcation closely.4
3Data series are obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) provided by the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, deﬂated with the GDP deﬂator, and divided by population. Government spend-
ing consists of consumption expenditure and gross investment; private consumption is personal consumption
expenditure on non-durable goods and services.
4In the small VAR, identiﬁcation is achieved by excluding a response of government spending within the
quarter. In the large VAR, we follow Perotti (2005) and assume that the price elasticity of real government
43.2 Is annual spending predetermined?
In estimating the VAR model on quarterly data, we test restrictions (6). Results reported in
table 1 show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis (7) and, hence, that annual government
spending is predetermined.










Note: Under the null, the tests are both dis-
tributed as χ
2(18) in the large and χ
2(6) in the
small VAR. Values are test statistics, p-values are
given in parentheses.
Figure (1) presents the impulse response functions of the quarterly models to an increase in
government spending by one percent of GDP. The upper row shows results for the baseline
3-variable VAR model, the lower row shows the results for government spending, output and
consumption obtained from the 7-variable VAR model. Importantly, in all panels we show
impulse responses of the restricted (dashed line) and the unrestricted model (solid line). There
is, however, hardly any diﬀerence across these responses—suggesting, in line with the results
reported in table 1, that the restrictions (6) are easily tolerated by the data. Finally, we note
that results for the baseline VAR and the 7-Variable speciﬁcation are fairly similar (see also
Perotti 2007). In the following, we focus on the results from the baseline VAR.
3.3 Spending shocks in quarterly and annual time-series
We turn to estimating the baseline VAR model on annual data. We allow for two lags.5 Given
the results of the previous section, we impose the restriction that annual government spending
is predetermined to identify government spending shocks.
Figure 2 reports the responses of government spending, output, and private consumption to
an exogenous increase in government spending by one percent of GDP obtained from the VAR
model estimated on annual data (solid line with squares). Qualitatively, results are similar
to those obtained unter the quarterly model. For a systematic comparison, we annualize
the responses of the unrestricted quarterly baseline model and plot them in the panels of
ﬁgure 2 (dashed-dotted line with circles). Clearly, while some diﬀerences can be observed,
spending is −0.5. In this case, we use an inﬂation adjusted measure of government spending when estimating
the equation for spending and also in the testing equation (8). In addition, we use instrumental variables when
estimating the VAR recursively.
5The Schwarz Information Criterion proposes two lags while Akaike and a recursive LR test propose three
lags. We use the more parsimonious speciﬁcation as it is closer to the quarterly VAR(4) model.
5the annualized responses obtained from the quarterly model are fairly close to those obtained
from the annual model.6
Finally, we also compare the identiﬁed government spending shocks obtained from the annual
model with the annualized shocks obtained from the unrestricted quarterly model. The shock
series are plotted in ﬁgure 3, showing a high degree of correlation.
4 Conclusion
Several authors have turned to VAR models to investigate the ﬁscal transmission mechanism
and identiﬁed government spending shocks by ruling out a contemporaneous response of gov-
ernment spending to the state of the economy. This assumption is fairly plausible at quarterly
frequency, because decision lags make it diﬃcult for policy makers to engineer discretionary
ﬁscal measures within the quarter.
For lack of quarterly data, several studies on non-U.S. time-series data employ the assumption
that annual government spending is predetermined as well. This assumption is more restric-
tive, given that supplements to the annual budget may be legislated throughout the year.
However, as annual and quarterly ﬁscal data are available for the U.S., we may actually test
whether annual government spending is predetermined.
We perform several tests and provide evidence that annual government spending is indeed
predetermined. As a caveat, we note that our experiments are conﬁned to the U.S. and
that institutional diﬀerences across countries limit the extent to which our results can be
generalized. Nevertheless, in case ﬁscal data are not available at quarterly frequency, our
results may provide some support for the identiﬁcation assumption that annual government
spending is predetermined.
6The annualized responses of the quarterly model tend to peak earlier than the annual responses. This
shift to the left disappears, once eight lags are included in the quarterly model.
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7A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Given the process deﬁned by (5), ga
t is predetermined relative to xa
t if FC is lower-































































As C−1 =   B(0), C is lower triangular if   B(0) is lower triangular. Given the deﬁnition of   B(0),
  B(0) =


   
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Figure 1: Eﬀect of government spending shock (quarterly data). Notes: Impulse responses to
exogenous increase in real government spending by one percent of GDP. Solid line: unrestricted baseline
model; shaded areas: bootstrapped 90 percent conﬁdence intervals; dashed line: restricted baseline model.
Vertical axes indicate deviations from unshocked path in percent of GDP. Horizontal axes indicate quarters.
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Figure 2: Eﬀect of government spending shock (annual vs. annualized responses). Notes:
Impulse responses to exogenous increase in real government spending by one percent of GDP. Solid line with
squares: annual baseline model; shaded areas: bootstrapped 90 percent conﬁdence intervals; dashed-dotted line
with circles: annualized impulse responses from unrestricted quarterly baseline model. Vertical axes indicate
deviations from unshocked path in percent of GDP. Horizontal axes indicate years.
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Figure 3: Annual vs. annualized shocks. Notes: Solid line with squares: annual shocks in baseline VAR;
dashed-dotted line with circles: annualized shocks in baseline VAR.
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